The Lessons of the Korean War for the Russia-Ukraine Conflict
DMZ, Korea / Source: Shutterstock
Originally Published in Horizons, Winter 2025
By James Jongsoo Lee
Studying the Korean War (1950–1953) may shed light on the ongoing war in Ukraine. The Korean conflict offers lessons for all stakeholders in the war in Ukraine, including Ukraine itself, as well as Russia, the United States, the United Kingdom, North Korea, and the European Union. Heeding those lessons can facilitate efforts to find a resolution to the ongoing war.
The parallels between the two wars are striking. First, just as the Korean War was the first “hot war” of the twentieth-century Cold War, the war in Ukraine is arguably the first “hot war” of the new cold war that is currently taking shape. Before the Korean War, the Cold War had already begun between two opposing camps shortly after the end of World War II, but the large-scale communist invasion of South Korea in June 1950 turned this conflict “hot” by starting a full-blown war of its own. Similarly, before the Ukraine war, a new cold war had already been simmering for some time, and it was the large-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 that turned this conflict “hot.”
A tribute to the first hot war of the twentieth-century Cold War, eerily similar to the ongoing conflict in Ukraine / Source: Guliver Image
The two conflicts share the following characteristic: a contest between the West (broadly defined to include states backed by the West, such as South Korea in the Korean War and Ukraine in the Ukraine war) and its opponents. In both conflicts, essentially the same logic propelled the Western response to the invasion by its opponents: namely, the domino theory—i.e., the aggressor must be deterred now, lest they go on to conquer more nations.
Second, just as the Korean War came as a consequence of the division of Korea, the war in Ukraine came as a consequence of the breakup of the Soviet Union. Modern world history shows that, when a unitary state splits or disintegrates, violent conflicts can ensue. Other examples illustrating this pattern include the conflict between India and Pakistan after the partition of the British Raj, conflicts in the former Yugoslavia, the American Civil War, and the Armenia-Azerbaijan and Russia-Georgia conflicts in the post-Soviet space.
Third, just as the Korean War turned into a stalemate in a war of attrition after its first year, the war in Ukraine has turned into a war of attrition after the first several months. In both cases, the war of attrition is reminiscent of the trench warfare on the Western Front during World War I, where the lives of many soldiers were lost to make tiny territorial gains.
Fourth, just as the Korean War could have escalated into a nuclear war or World War III, the war in Ukraine carries the risk of similar escalation. That the Korean War did not escalate further was thanks to the restraint shown by then-U.S. President Harry Truman and Soviet leader Joseph Stalin. Truman refused to authorize the use of nuclear weapons and decided against escalating the war beyond the Korean Peninsula into communist China. Stalin, for his part, carefully avoided a war against the United States and strictly ordered his military not to engage in direct fighting in the Korean War except for limited aerial combat with U.S. fighter planes.
To be sure, there are important differences between the two wars. For example, although the Korean War began as a war between the two Koreas, it quickly escalated into an international conflict with massive numbers of foreign troops—mainly those from the United States and communist China—fighting in Korea. In comparison, the Ukraine war has so far mostly remained a conflict between the original antagonists—namely Russia and Ukraine—except for the recent intervention by North Korean troops.
However, despite the differences, studying the experience of the Korean War is highly pertinent to understanding the ongoing war in Ukraine and can inform efforts to prevent its escalation into a global nuclear conflict. As such, leaders in Kiev, Moscow, Washington, Pyongyang and other capitals would do well to heed the lessons from the Korean War.
Studying how the Korean War came to an end can offer clues for how the conflict in Ukraine may end. The Korean War turned into a stalemate after the first year, but it took more than two years to finally end it. What made ending the war possible was, first, an apparent change in China’s war aims and, second, the death of Stalin in 1953.
When China sent its massive army into Korea in late 1950 and experienced initial successes vis-à-vis the United Nations forces led by the United States, its war aim was probably to drive the UN forces completely out of the Korean peninsula. However, after encountering heavy losses in the subsequent engagements against the UN forces, China apparently changed its aims to that of protecting its national security and bringing about a negotiated settlement. Nevertheless, despite this change, China was still willing to keep fighting in Korea in the war of attrition that followed. China agreed to end the war only when the new Soviet leadership wanted to end the war and exerted pressure on Beijing to do so.
Like China in the Korean War, Russian President Vladimir Putin’s war aims have probably changed since the beginning of the Ukraine war. After encountering stiff resistance and setbacks at the hands of the Ukrainian defenders, Russia shifted its military focus to eastern Ukraine, where the conflict devolved into a war of attrition. Russia’s war aims have likely changed from that of conquering Ukraine to that of consolidating its territorial gains since the annexation of Crimea. However, Putin still seems willing to keep fighting in this war of attrition, and the recent intervention of North Korean troops may help him to continue his war effort.
As for Ukraine, President Volodymyr Zelenskyy is probably in no position politically to concede any territory occupied by Russia since the annexation of Crimea. Therefore, he is likely to keep on fighting, especially if he can continue to receive more substantial Western support for his war effort. He may agree to stop fighting only if he can get a negotiated settlement that is politically acceptable.
If the experience of the Korean War is any guide, the war in Ukraine is more likely to come to an end if there is a change in the top leadership of either Russia or Ukraine and the new leadership desires to end the war. The experience of the Korean War also suggests that the Ukraine war may more likely end if those supporting Kiev or Moscow put pressure on the belligerents to cease hostilities.
The aftermath of the Korean War also offers hints as to the aftermath of the war in Ukraine. The fighting on the Korean peninsula came to an end with an armistice agreement, not a formal peace treaty, with the war turning into a frozen conflict. However, the Korean peninsula has experienced more than 70 years of relative peace without a major disruption under that armistice agreement.
It is possible that the fighting in the Ukraine war may eventually come to an end with a ceasefire agreement, given the much greater difficulty of agreeing on the terms of a peace treaty. Nevertheless, such an outcome, though far from optimal, may still be desirable given that a ceasefire agreement can help pave the way for a long-lasting peace. All stakeholders in the war in Ukraine, therefore, would do well to study the lessons of the Korean War if their goal is to avoid a catastrophic nuclear World War III and bring an end to the horrific suffering engendered by the war.
James Jongsoo Lee is Senior Managing Director at Brock Securities and Center Associate at Harvard University’s Davis Center for Russian and Eurasian Studies. He is also Adjunct Fellow at the Hawaii-based Pacific Forum and Contributing Editor at The Diplomat. He can be followed on X at @jameslee004.
The views and opinions expressed here are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the Pacific Council.
