Regional contagion is the main risk of the war in Ukraine

Photo by Nati

BY MADALIN BLIDARU

In Eastern Europe, conflicts do not have boundaries. Two global wars started in this region, driven by similar causes, a combination of ethnonationalism, militarism and protectionism. 

These ghosts remain with us today. Not so different was the rhetoric used by Vladimir Putin on 24th of February when he declared the so-called “special military operation” against Ukraine, in fact an act of aggression and a crime of war. The background of great power politics drives the disaster, but it was expected under internal logical of the above-mentioned haunting spirits. When diplomacy fails, power arrives and, usually, wins the game. And everyone knows that when the elephants fight, the grass gets trampled. 

There is a real threat of contagion of the war in Ukraine in the entire Eastern Europe and, from Eastern Europe, the next chapters are open. Three channels of transmission of the contagion can be underlined. These will explain not only the contagion risk, but also the causes of the war in Ukraine. 

Firstly, history, identity, and ideology are weapons of mass destruction, and these variables connect people across geographies. It could be across the Kerch Strait or even divided by the Carpathians. These three elements, together with the current international context, can put the region on fire, not that the bombings against Ukrainian cities and over 5 million potential refugees in the neighboring countries are not enough to describe it as such. 

When in Belgrade the pro-Russian Serbs organized marches supporting the Kremlin's crimes against peace, this should be a warning about the spillover in the Balkans. Significant parts of societies are living in alternative realities, dominated by polarization, and unable to reach common ground. For over a year already, the federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina has been under scrutiny in relation to the sustainability of the federation and the interethnic institutional framework that maintained peace. The resovereignisation actions of Republika Srpska were condemned by OSCE as going against the letter and the spirit of the Dayton Peace Agreement. 

In Moldova, the request to join the European Union was immediately followed by a request from the separatist Transnistria to have its independence recognised. From Odessa to Tiraspol, the capital of Transnistria, you need only two hours. The conflict contagion scenario would probably also include the Caucasus and the Baltics, reaching directly half of Europe. In a prolonged conflict scenario, with an economic crisis on the horizon, Western Europe cannot sustain a crisis of such a magnitude. 

The second transmission element: corruption and organized crime. Corruption and organized crime nurture vulnerabilities in the societies in Eastern Europe. These countries have scores closer to Russia in Transparency International’s Corruption Perception Index than to the scores of some advanced economies with whom these countries share the same European institutions. This vulnerability will be exploited by malign actors and used against societies and economies, while impairing their development. Unsurprisingly, citizens are surprised by the rates they hear for the informal costs of leaving the war in Ukraine by crossing the border, despite of being illegal for some categories of citizens; of course, if you are not the ordinary refugee, since 99% do not have the thousands of euros to avoid the law and the war and to start a better life in a new country. Anecdotes circulate about the unfortunate times of the current border officers, in an EU member state, that do not have today the same opportunities to amass some bribe-based wealth from the exploitation of the power position in relation to refugees. While corruption remains a problem here too, everyone remembers the lawless time before the EU accession. 

Transnational crime networks will profit from the situation in Ukraine in many imaginable and unimaginable ways from human trafficking, including with Western Europe as destination, to arms trafficking across Europe and money laundering at scale. Similarly, they won’t have a problem in making a business model from the sanctions against Russia and Belarus. Their borders will remain open, and they will find ways to avoid the punishment against the aggression of the Putin regime, as the oligarchs and the regime affiliates will do. Not as good as for the people that need medicines, better food, and jobs. 

Administrative capacity is the third channel. For many citizens, a weak state is good because they can protect themselves from the state. Many tragedies were perpetrated by the state in this region, and they remember the moments. Without rule of law, there is no law nor constraints on the crude use of power by those claiming it from the top and keeping it by fear. Nowadays, these states are having issues in ensuring good governance, coordination, enforcement of rules, addressing policy challenges or generating inclusive institutions. There are multiple causes, it is a distinct discussion. 

At the moment, however, a sustained external support is needed to ensure that the authorities will be able to manage the direct and indirect impact of the invasion of Ukraine and the following sanctions, from the integration of the refugees and avoiding the multi-generational trap of building refugee camps to addressing the associated economic issues - in Romania, around 36% of the population was at risk of poverty social exclusion, 50% more than the EU average, and that was before the current wave of inflation, second-round effects of the sanctions (including the impact of increasing energy, food, and industrial inputs prices) or the additional fiscal pressure from increasing the defense spending and the solidarity with the people fleeing the war. Similar issues can be found in Moldova, Ukraine, Bulgaria, and other countries in the region. A substantial economic scarring after this crisis is guaranteed. 

A prolonged conflict will unleash the forces of shared historical narratives and identities, of corruption and organized crime, and those will meet administrations unable to contain and to provide solutions to ensure the welfare of their populations. 

A war that is not limited to a single jurisdiction carries risks against stability, security, and peace in the entire region. Therefore, dealing with this conflict requires prioritization. 

First and foremost, the conditions for peace must be recognized together with a guaranteed independence for Ukraine and support for post-conflict reconstruction. A special regime for the self-governing pro-Russian regions of Ukraine is necessary, if possible backed internationally. Stopping the bombing and the withdrawal of the Russian forces are prerequisites for the next steps. 

Support is needed for the countries dealing with a wave of refugees they haven’t met since World War II. Today, the Ukrainian refugees can find shelter in every city, town, and village in this country, have access to education immediately and, on paper, access to employment, yet it is necessary to remember that the discussion is about countries with a precarity of jobs. Without a mature policy package bringing quality jobs and productive investments, a chance will be lost both by persons and states. 

Thirdly, and probably the most complicated and politically challenging, is to make Russia a responsible actor in the region. It appears aspirational, but without a responsible, minimally integrated Russia in the region, as it was for more than 500 years, peace won’t be sustainable. Today, the West has a weapon that it can direct to achieve this aim: sanctions rollback against domestic reforms in Russia. Reform Russia and Putin won’t have a legacy built on the success of ethno-nationalism, militarism and protectionism. 

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Madalin Blidaru is a member of the Pacific Council on International Policy, a policy-oriented researcher and a political analyst specialised in International Relations, mainly EU foreign policy, EU neighbourhood, regional governance and interregional relations.

The views and opinions expressed here are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the Pacific Council.