Japan As a Bridge-Builder for United States Interests in the Indo-Pacific
By Shihoko Goto
When Donald Trump won the United States presidency the first time around, it took the world by surprise. One of Japan’s strengths at the time was to be ahead of the curve in reaching out and understanding the value of establishing a personal rapport with the newly elected leader. Prime Minister Shinzo Abe became the first foreign leader to visit the president-elect at Trump Tower in November 2016, and Abe’s commitment to connect personally with the president played a not insignificant role for Japan to maintain strong relations with the United States.
This time around, no foreign government has been caught flat-footed about Trump emerging victorious once again, with Japan being no exception. Despite planning for a second Trump administration, however, Tokyo will be grappling to position itself to maintain solid bilateral ties and to ensure that its own national interests can move forward.
One significant challenge will be as a result of Japan’s own domestic political realities under a politically weak leadership. Japan, too, has had a new leader since late September. But since he took office, public support for Prime Minister Shigeru Ishiba has been weak, and his Liberal Democratic Party fell far short of the majority it needed in the powerful Lower House of the Diet in the latest parliamentary election held under his watch. While the LDP remains the single-biggest political party in Japan, the need to form an expansive coalition government and lack of popular support, speculation about Ishiba’s days in office being numbered continues to grow. The prospect of leadership change at a time when personal ties to President Trump is political capital will put Japan at a disadvantage.
The bigger challenge, though, is uncertainty about U.S. economic and foreign policy moving forward that could go against Japan’s own interests. On the economic front, the prospect of Trump pushing through his campaign promises of imposing tariffs of 60 percent on all Chinese goods and 10 percent on imports from all other countries, including Japan, is a threat to its own economic outlook. For Japanese manufacturers, the high tariffs will be a double whammy for their bottom line as many companies either produce goods or have their products within Chinese-made products that will be labeled as Made in China. At the same time, goods made in Japan would be hit by new U.S. tariffs. The tariffs would also come at a time when the United States recently surpassed China to become the biggest export destination of products made in Japan once again, led by the automobile industry. While Japanese companies could accelerate boosting investments in the United States as a means to circumvent tariffs, such a move could hamper Japan’s own domestic competitiveness and resilience in the longer term.
On the security front, expectations are high that the Trump administration will demand more from Japan to support U.S. troops within Japan and specifically to increase its defense budget so that it can play a greater role to promote regional security. At the same time, there is growing concern amongst Japanese policymakers about the United States’ own commitment to the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty and wariness about Americans viewing the United States less and less as an Indo-Pacific power with decreased interest in the region.
What is certain is that the second Trump administration will have a new approach to dealing with the ongoing global conflicts, especially as Trump himself repeatedly stated on the campaign trail that he would bring a swift end to the ongoing conflict between Russia and Ukraine. At the same time, Trump as presidential candidate has declared that U.S. commitment to Israel remains unshaken. How such declarations will be translated into actual policy that will be executed and how such policies will impact regional alliances, including U.S. commitment to NATO, remain to be seen. But within the United States, hostility towards China remains a barometer to gauge patriotism across party lines, with Trump being no exception. As the president-elect continues to view China as a strategic threat to the United States both militarily and economically, Japan sees that as a window to push for Washington to increase its commitment to the Indo-Pacific on both fronts is also on the rise as well.
Japan, too, shares the U.S. threat perception regarding China on the security front, and Tokyo can play a key role in ensuring that the United States remains committed to working together with Japan as well as other like-minded countries to work together to stave off Chinese violation of the rule of law and its territorial claims. But like much of the rest of the Indo-Pacific as well as Europe, Japan has a more nuanced approach when it comes to meeting the China challenge on the economic front. Both Japan and the United States have a shared interest in pushing back against Chinese acquisition of advanced technology and Beijing’s use of technology for military and surveillance purposes. The challenge for the Japanese leadership will be to make clear what the shared interests between Washington and Tokyo are and to identify areas where closer cooperation between the two sides can be more cost-effective and efficient.
Shihoko Goto is the director the Indo-Pacific Program at the Wilson Center. Her research focuses on the economics and politics of Japan, Taiwan, and South Korea, as well as US policy in Northeast Asia. A seasoned journalist and analyst, she has reported from Tokyo and Washington for Dow Jones and UPI on the global economy, international trade, and Asian markets. A columnist for The Diplomat magazine and contributing editor to The Globalist, she was previously a donor country relations officer for the World Bank and has been awarded fellowships from the East-West Center and the Knight Foundation, among others.
The views and opinions expressed here are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the Pacific Council.
